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MONACO LAW REVIEW | DECEMBER 2025 | COURTROOM INSIGHTS
the withdrawal of the action, leaving the assessment of its
scope to the trial judges.
responsible is liable to make reparation. Compensation must
be full and must take into account all elements of the damage
sustained.
AB
YS
Loss of Chance Is Compensable
Where the Probability of a Favourable
Event Has Already and Definitively
Disappeared
Court of Revision, 30 June 2025
Case R.6313 – Appeal No. 000068
BACKGROUND:
Following a road traffi c accident, the victim, who was
injured while crossing at a pedestrian crossing, was forced
to stop working and to take early retirement. The Court of
Revision had previously quashed a judgment of the Court of
Appeal which had declared inadmissible the claim for loss of
earnings to date and had rejected the claim for loss of future
earnings, on the ground that the appellate court had failed to
examine whether the victim had lost a chance of obtaining a
full pension as a result of the accident. On remittal, the Court
recognised that the loss of a chance to obtain a full pension
constituted direct and established damage.
ANALYSIS:
The Court reiterated the fundamental principle that “where, as a
result of the offence, the probability of a favourable event has disappeared,
the damage arising from that loss of chance is direct and certain”.
The victim’s forced cessation of work resulted in a loss of
income subject to pension contributions and thus in the
disappearance of a real and serious chance of improving
their pension entitlement, notwithstanding that they had
demonstrated an intention to continue working until the age
of seventy in order to qualify for a full pension.
The Court affi rmed the autonomous legal character of loss-
of-chance damage, and reiterated that a reduction coeffi cient
must invariably be applied, as the lost chance is not the benefi t
itself: “the assessment of loss of chance must refl ect the chance lost
and cannot be equivalent to the advantage that the chance would have
yielded had it materialised.”
SIGNIFICANCE:
The loss of a chance constitutes established damage.
The judgment forms part of a consistent line of case law
recognising that the loss of a chance to obtain a full pension
is compensable where the victim establishes an incapacity
attributable to the offence, an intention to continue working,
and a causal link between that incapacity and the reduction
of their pension entitlements.
Where the probability of a favourable event has been
eliminated by the occurrence of the harmful act, the person
Fraudulent Non-Disclosure:
An Illustrative Application of
Monegasque Case Law
Court of Revision, 30 June 2025
Case R.6312. Appeal No. 2024-000060
BACKGROUND:
A high-risk fi nancial transaction resulted in the realisation of
that risk. The claimants argued that their consent had been
vitiated by dol, the bank’s adviser having deliberately failed
to disclose various material elements. The question was
whether the bank’s silence regarding essential information
could constitute fraudulent non-disclosure within the
meaning of Article 971 of the Monegasque Civil Code.
The Court recalled the classic defi nition of dol — fraudulent
conduct, misrepresentations or intentional silence (réticence
dolosive) that induce an error determining the victim’s
consent — together with the legal duties of loyalty, diligence
and disclosure imposed on authorised fi nancial institutions.
ANALYSIS:
The Court found that the bank had concealed essential
information which any prudent professional was required to
disclose to an inexperienced investor. It held that there was
intentional réticence dolosive, arising from the breach of a
statutory duty of transparency.
By relying on the Monegasque prudential framework (Law No.
1.338/2007 and Ordinance No. 1.284/2007) to anchor the bank’s
liability in a clearly defi ned ethical and regulatory context, the
Court strengthened the normative force of the duty to advise
and inform incumbent upon authorised fi nancial institutions
and gave these prudential rules operative legal effect.
SIGNIFICANCE:
The Court reaffi rmed that dol may arise from silence where
a pre-contractual duty of disclosure exists. Dol is not merely
a failure to inform: it requires something more, namely a
deliberate omission. In this case, the intentional element was
presumed because the professional deliberately failed to
disclose a known and decisive risk. The judgment thus confi rms
intentional réticence dolosive as a ground for the nullity of a
fi nancial transaction and strengthens the duty of disclosure
owed by banking institutions to non-expert clients.
The sanction of nullity was applied rigorously, refl ecting a clear
intention to protect confi dence in the Monegasque fi nancial
system. The bank is not merely an intermediary, but an informed
actor under a duty to provide clear guidance to its client.
YS
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